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Abstract. We consider the following game. K players compete in
N simultaneous contests. Each player i has a limited resource Xi and must
decide how to allocate it to N contests. In each contest, if player i allocates
more resources than player j,p l a y e ri has a higher chance to win the contest
than player j.
We ﬁnd a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium. Moreover, if individual
resources are private information, there exists a unique monotonic symmetric
Bayesian equilibrium.
1. Introduction
Consider elections where each candidate has a campaign budget. The candidates have
to allocate their campaign budgets (for media advertisement) among several states.
If two candidates allocate diﬀe r e n ta m o u n t sf o rt h es a m es t a t e ,t h ec a n d i d a t ew i t h
higher amount has higher chance to win this state. Diﬀerent states can have diﬀerent
values (number of votes) and diﬀerent candidates can have diﬀerent campaign bud-
gets. Each candidate wants to maximize a number of states she wins (the value of
those states). This election situation is typical for USA, Russia, France, and other
countries.
How should candidates allocate their budgets? How diﬀerent the behavior of
candidates with diﬀerent budgets should be? Will all candidates compete for all
states? These and similar questions are analyzed in this paper.
We consider K players competing in N simultaneous contests with diﬀerent val-
ues. Each player has her ﬁxed budget and has to allocate it among N contests. The
main assumption of this paper is that the winner of each contest is determined sto-
chastically. In other words, we will assume that each contest is a lottery where higher
wager means higher chance to win.
Given our main assumption we ﬁnd a unique symmetric equilibrium of the game.
It turns out that the players allocate their budgets in the same proportion in the
symmetric Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the individual equilibrium strategy depends
on the contests’ values and the individual budget, but it is independent from the
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budgets of all other players. The equilibrium has a monotonic property: a player
with higher budget has higher chance to win each contest. It is interesting to note
that each player competes in each contest in the symmetric Nash equilibrium.
We consider also a situation when individual budgets are private information. It
turns out that there exists a unique monotonic Bayesian equilibrium. Each player
believes that all players allocate their budgets in the same proportion as it is in the
case of complete information, and allocates her own budget in the same way. This
is the main result of the paper. Since in many elections candidates indeed do not
know budgets of other candidates, our result suggests a campaign budget allocation
in these cases.
There are many other applications of our model, such as R&D, arm races, military
conﬂicts, simultaneous rent-seeking activities, and so on.
There are two directions in the literature which are closed to the topic of this pa-
per. The ﬁrst one is diﬀerent Colonel Blotto games, see Borel (1921), Blackett (1958),
Laslier and Picard (2002), Kvasov (2006), and Weinstein (2006) among other. The
main diﬀerence between our approach and this literature is that our contest winners
are determined stochastically (which is almost always the case in the applications)
and their contest winners are chosen deterministically: the player with the highest
spending in a contest is the winner of this contest. We consider a general case: K
players, diﬀerent budgets, and diﬀerent values in diﬀerent contests. We ﬁnd a unique
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies in the general case. All papers on Colonel Blotto
games have two competing players and analyze diﬀerent mixed-strategy equilibria.
Borel (1921), Blackett (1958), Weinstein (2006) consider identical budgets, three con-
tests with the same values. Laslier and Picard (2002) consider N contests with the
same values. Kvasov (2006) introduces a cost function of the budget and considers
identical values and budgets; identical budgets and diﬀerent values; identical values
and diﬀerent budgets. Our main assumption makes payoﬀ functions continuous and
allows obtaining a unique prediction. Classic Colonel Blotto games have multiplicity
of equilibria. Our paper is the ﬁrst which considers a situation when budgets are
private information.
The second direction is a contest literature. This literature considers one contest
(see Tullock, 1980; Nitzan, 1994, among other) or a sequence of contests (Rosen,
1986; Matros, 2006, among other) when the winner is determined stochastically. The
only paper in which players have ﬁxed resources, Matros (2006), considers elimination
tournaments. This paper is a natural extension of the contest literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We consider the model and results
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2. The Model
There are K political candidates. Each candidate k has a campaign budget Xk which
she can spend for her election campaign. We will use upper index for the candidates.
There are N states. The value of state i is Wi for all players. We will use lower index
for the states. Suppose that all state values and budgets are common knowledge.
Each candidate k has to allocate her campaign budget Xk across all N states. The
candidates are competing in all N states simultaneously. We assume that candidate






,w h e r ex
j
i is the campaign budget allocation
of candidate j for state i. Nobody wins state i,i fxk
i =0f o rk =1 ,...,K.
All candidates submit their campaign budget allocations simultaneously. A pure






































































































































































is the total campaign spending of all candidates on state l.N o ww ec a nﬁnd the total













































is the total campaign spending on all states, or the total budget of all candidates.

































































⎠, for any i,l =1 ,...,N, (9)
or



































































































































































a n dw eo b t a i nt h ef o l l o w i n gr e s u l t
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First, note that the symmetric equilibrium is unique by the construction.
Second, all candidates compete for all states in the symmetric equilibrium. The
intuition for this result is straightforward: since even a (very) small amount gives a
positive chance to win a state, each candidate tries to win each state.
Third, the unique symmetric equilibrium has a monotonic property: a candidate
with higher budget has higher chance to win each state.
Finally, Theorem 1 shows that the equilibrium budget allocation of candidate k
depends on states’ values, (W1,...,WN), and her own budget, Xk, and is independent
from budgets of all other candidates. It means that if a candidate does not know
the budgets of all other candidates, but believes that those budgets will be allocated
according to (11), she will allocate her budget according to (11) too.
Theorem 2. Suppose that individual budgets are private information. Then there
exists a monotonic symmetric Bayesian equilibrium where candidate k with budget






















and believes that each candidate allocates the budget according to (12).
Theorem 2 describes a monotonic symmetric Bayesian equilibrium. Note that
the players do not need to know the distribution function of individual budgets. It
is enough to have “the right” beliefs which are consistent in the equilibrium. An
interesting feature of the equilibrium is the same proportion allocation of the budget
for all players. This feature gives the monotonic property: higher budget gives higher
chance to win each contest.
3. Conclusion
We consider a stochastic K-player Blotto game where players have diﬀerent budgets
and diﬀerent contests have diﬀerent values. We show that there exists a unique
symmetric Nash equilibrium. In this equilibrium, each player allocates her resources
in the same proportion and competes in each contest. Therefore, the symmetric
equilibrium has a monotonic property.
We show that if individual budgets are private information, there exists a monotonic
symmetric Bayesian equilibrium. Our analysis demonstrates that the equilibrium al-
location (12) is robust: it does not matter either players know anything about budgets
of other players. It will be interesting to test our predictions in the experimental lab.Stochastic K-player Blotto games 7
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